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Death Destroys a Man, But the Idea of Death Saves Him.
-Edwin Morgan Forster

I.

INTRODUCTION

On the morning of August 29, 1981, Clarence Herbert lay comatose in his sterile hospital room attached to life-support equipment.1 At 9:15 that morning, Neil Barber, M.D. (the internist to the
1. Memorandum of Points and Authorities with Statement of the Case Supporting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 7, People v. Barber, No. A 025 586 (Cal.
L.A. Mun. Ct. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Brief].
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patient's surgeon, Robert Nejdl, M.D.) disconnected Mr. Herbert's
respirator in the presence of the patient's wife, and had the moisture to the endotracheal tube2 turned off.3 Mr. Herbert's life did
not end with the withdrawal of the respirator. He continued to
breathe. The family steadfastly awaited his death. Fearing it
would disturb Mr. Herbert, the family refused to allow the nurses
4
to provide the care routinely given to comatose patients. Two
days after the removal of the respirator, Dr. Barber, with the famfly's consent, withdrew the intravenous feeding and hydration
tubes. Mr. Herbert was pronounced dead six days later. 5 The Los
Angeles County Prosecutor charged Doctors Nejdl and Barber
with murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
The case ran its judicial course through three California
courts. 6 Judge Crahan of the Los Angeles Municipal Court dismissed the charges after a preliminary hearing on the basis that
there was no evidence that the doctors' actions were the proximate
cause of death, and the prosecution did not offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the steps taken by the doctors were in7
tended to mask or mitigate damages attributable to malpractice.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County overruled the dismissal
and reinstated the criminal complaint: 8 "In view of the public interest in this case, the court wants to point out that at this point in
the proceedings the prosecution need only show a strong suspicion
of guilt."9 Judge Wenke stressed that the pretrial hearing did not
2. An endotracheal tube is a plastic tube extending outside the nose or mouth
down past the vocal cords and is used to maintain the patient's airway. 5 A
LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 33.9 (C. Frankel & R. Patterson rev. ed.
1972).
3. The air mist to the endotracheal tube was terminated five minutes after the
respirator was disconnected. The prosecutor stated that this act was intended to facilitate the accumulation of mucus to block Mr. Herbert's airway,
but a concerned nurse had the air mist restarted before this could occur.
Prosecution's Points and Authorities for Preliminary Hearing at 8, People v.
Barber, No. A 025 586 (Cal. L.A. Mun. Ct. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Prosecution's Brief].
4. The family repeatedly told members of the nursing staff that they wanted all
treatment to be stopped. On one occasion, the simple addition of potassium
to Mr. Herbert's I.V. made the family quite upset, and prompted one of Mr.
Herbert's sons to scream the prescribing physician's name repeatedly. Defendant's Brief, supra note 1, at 7-9.
5. Prosecution's Brief, supra note 3, at 9.
6. People v. Barber, No. A 025 586 (L.A. Mun. Ct. 1983) (criminal complaints
dismissed after preliminary hearing); People v. Barber, No. A 025 586 (Cal.
L.A. County Super. Ct. 1983) (complaints reinstated); Barber v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (vacated Superior
Court's reinstatement of complaints and denied people's motions).
7. People v. Barber, No. A 025 586, at 10 (Cal. L.A. Mun. Ct. 1983).
8. People v. Barber, No. A 025 586 (Cal. L.A. County Super. Ct. 1983).
9. Id. at 4.
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reveal whether the patient's coma was irreversible-a necessary

condition for termination of life-sustaining measures under California law10-which, considering the bifurcated positions, must be
established at a trial on the merits. The California Court of Appeals upheld the Municipal Court's dismissal." Relieved by the
appellate court's decision, Nejdl and Barber returned to their vocations. The medical profession applauded the decision as one that

would relieve the medical community from criminal liability in
such situations.12 However, the language of the decision presents

serious doubt to the validity of such an interpretation. The court
emphasized that a doctor who had acted with precipitous motives
would be criminally liable for the patient's death. 13
The issue of continued treatment for comatose or vegetative patients has been addressed by courts' 4 and commentators15 alike.
The narrower issues of whether nourishment and hydration are in
fact treatment, and whether physicians should be held criminally
liable in these situations, have seldom been addressed. 16 While

Barber is the first major decision of its kind,17 its solitude does not
reflect the frequency of such situations. 8
10. Id.

11. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
12. See AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 28, 1983, at 1.
13. "For the purposes of this decision, however, we accept the superior court
judge's analysis that if petitioners unlawfully and intentionally killed Mr.
Herbert, the malice could be presumed regardless of their motive." Barber v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (1983).
14. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
15. In addition to the many commentators noted throughout this Article, see generally M. MANNES, THE RIGHT TO DIE: SHOULD THERE BE A LAW? (1973); G.
W I.Ams, THE SANCTrrY OF IFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957); EUTHANASIA
AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH: THE CASE FOR VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA (A. Down-

ing ed. 1969); THE MOMENT OF DEATH: A SyMPosIum (A. Winter ed. 1969);
Your DEATH WARRANT? (J. Gould & L. Craigmyle eds. 1971); BENEFICIENT EUTHANASIA (M. Kohl ed. 1975).
16. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
17. "To our knowledge, however, this case is the first instance in which the issue
has been present in the context of a criminal prosecution." Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (1983).
18. One writer notes that there are about 5,000 persistently vegetative patients
currently cared for in the United States. See Rust, Lifelines, FineLines, STUDENT LAw., Jan. 1984, at 12, 13. See also Gaylin, Harvesting the Dead, in
BIOETHICS 517 (T. Shannon ed. 1981) (proposing that society should metabolically maintain donated cadavers for research, for surgical practice, and above
all, as constant sources of vital fluids, tissues and organs). Gaylin believes
that there would be a large number of salvageable, brain dead cadavers from
"accidents (about 113,000 per year), suicides (around 24,000 per year), homicides (18,000), and cerebrovascular accidents (some 210,000 per year)." Id. at
525. However, it is difficult to determine how many of these victims are fit for
this purpose because physicians practice "euthanasia on an ad hoc, casual,
and perhaps irresponsible basis." Id. at 518.
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This Article will address the propriety of the Barber decision
and its ramifications. The purposes of the Article are twofold.
First, it will be argued that, contrary to the Barber court's reasoning, intravenous feeding and hydration are not treatments but
rather sustenance; therefore, they cannot be discontinued simply
because a patient is incurably comatose. This position will be analyzed in Part II of this Article. The second, and major, purpose is
to recommend methods for dealing with the problems inherently
associated with the care of incurably comatose patients. An appraisal of these methods will be made in Part III of this Article.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWING THE I.V.
The effect of the Barber decision was to establish legal precedent for the position that withholding nutrition and hydration from
comatose patients is not murder. For a proper analysis of this position, the first consideration must be the pertinent legal history
existing prior to the Barber decision. After a brief summation of
the legal precedent, the case and its ramifications will be explored.
A.

The Line of Authority

The debate over the justification for discontinuing life-support
systems rests mainly in a diversity of axioms attributable to different ethical theories.19 This diversity is seen in the disparate statutes 20 and court decisions 2 1 handed down across the nation. Each
represents a philosophy of the issuing institution pertaining to the
use and disuse of life-support equipment. While the rationales are
conflicting, the end results always hinge on the courts' determination of whether it is better to maintain a comatose but metaboli19. The conflict is waged primarily between four prominent schools of philosophical thought. Act utilitarianism would view the withdrawal as acceptable if it
would maximize the total good. On the other hand, rule utilitarianism focuses on the resulting societal insecurity that is fostered by the killing of innocent human beings and the moral decay and callousness that would result
once any form of killing is allowed. Naturallaw (or modern Thomism) would
turn to the "principle of double effect" to determine whether the morally
good result prevails. Kantian principles would demand that one treat the
patient as an end rather than a means to an end, the result of which is to
challenge the actor to prove the act's moral validity by demonstrating that it
should become a universal law. For a thorough analysis of these ideological
clashes and their consequences in medical decisonmaking, see D. WALTON,
ETHIcs OF WrrHDRAWAL OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 1-29 (1983).
20. Some states adhere to common law notions of death, while others have
adopted statutes similar to the Uniform Determination of Death Act. Id. at
76-79. For a discussion of the common law definition of death, see infra notes
91 & 181. For a discussion of the Uniform Determination of Death Act, see
infra text accompanying notes 187-91.
21. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
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patient, or to succumb to the concept of "death with
cally alive
dignity"?22
In civil cases, the courts have balanced both the constitutional
and common law rights of the patient and the state. The constitutional footings concerning the care of dying or immedicable patients were firmly set in In re Quinlan on March 31, 1976.23 In this
case, an unconscious Karen Ann Quinlan arrived by ambulance at
Newton Memorial Hospital after her breathing had stopped. 24 She
was placed on a respirator and later diagnosed to be in a "chronic
persistent vegetative state."25 Neurologists determined that Ms.
Quinlan was not brain dead, 26 but that she would never regain sapient cognizance. 27 When the medical staff refused to honor the
family's request that the respirator be removed, Karen's father
brought suit to become her appointed guardian. He sought this
him to order the
status under the assumption that it would enable
28
physicians to withdraw Karen's respirator.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the consitutional right to privacy 29 incor22. But see Jackson &Youngner, PatientAutonomy and "Death With Dignity'"
Some ClinicalCaveats,20 JunwETxmcs J. 348 (1980) (concerning the practical

difficulty of defining "death with dignity" on a case by case basis).
23. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
24. Id. at 23, 355 A.2d at 653-54.
25. A chronic persistent vegetative state was defined by expert witness Dr. Fred
Plum as the condition of a "'subject who remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function but who... no longer has
any cognitive function."' Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. Dr. Plum distinguished
cognitive or sapient functions from vegetative functions of the brain, and indicated their relevance to the concept of "brain death":
We have an internal vegetative regulation which controls body temperature, which controls breathing, which controls to a considerable
degree blood pressure, which controls to some degree heart rate,
which controls chewing, swallowing and which controls sleeping and
waking. We have a more highly developed brain which is uniquely
human which controls our relation to the outside world, our capacity
to talk, to see, to feel, to sing, to think. Brain death necessarily must
mean the death of both of these functions of the brain, vegetative and
the sapient. Therefore, the presence of any function which is regulated or governed or controlled by the deeper parts of the brain
which in laymen's terms might be considered purely vegetative
would mean that the brain is not biologically dead.
Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654-55.
26. Id. See infra note 75.
27. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 26, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (1976).
28. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
29. The right of privacy emanates from the penumbra of guarantees expressed
by the Bill of Rights and implied in the first, fourth, ninth and fourteenth
amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). From this unspecified zone, courts have reasoned that the individual has a constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center,
421 A.2d 1334 (DeL 1980); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980);
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porated a right to choose or decline medical treatment that invariably leads to a vegetative patient's right to die. 30 A two-step
determination thus ensues: first, since a patient may choose to die
under these situations, and "no external compelling interest of the
State could compel [the patient] to endure the unendurable," 3 1 a
quality of life judgment must be made; 32 second, a substituted
judgment test 33 then determines whether that particular incompetent patient would elect to continue at that level of existence. 34
The New Jersey Supreme Court believed that Ms. Quinlan would
have opted against further treatment if she was competent to do
s0. 35 This determination arguably created a presumption that patients in a vegetative state would prefer non-treatment. 36 Karen
was moved to Morris View Nursing Home. 37 The respirator was
disconnected but Karen continued to breathe on her own and sur-

30.
31.
32.

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983); Leach
v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 738 (1983); In re
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). For a discussion of the balancing
of state and constitutional interests in treatment decisions, see generally
Cantor, A Patient'sDecision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus The Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228 (1973);
Note, CompulsoryMedical Treatment and ConstitutionalGuarantees:A Conflict?, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 628 (1972).
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
Id.
The quality of life concept assumes that a line can be drawn at a point where
life is no longer worth living. D. CRANE, THE SANCTrrY OF SOCIAL LIFE: PHYSIClANS' TREATMENT OF CrICALLY ILL PATIENTS (1975). But see St. Martin, Euthanasia: The Three-In-One Issue, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 62 (1975) (arguing that
life is always worth living).
The test's designation-"substitute judgment"-has a complex and legitimate ring to it. The irony is that allowing one to refuse treatment for another,
under the presumption that the patient would not want to continue to exist in
his present condition, is inconsistent with society's sanctions against suicide.
Why should an incompetent person's imputed wish to die be honored, while
the same desire of a completely cognizant person would be denied? For example, Judge Hews of the California Superior Court of Riverside County refused to grant a quadriplegic cerebral palsy victim's request not to be fed.
Death, 70 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1984, at 29. Elizabeth Bouvia was denied the restraining order to prevent the hospital from force-feeding her, because she
was mentally competant. Id. The rationale was simple: "We honestly hope
this young woman will realize there is hope in life." Id. See also P. RAMSEY,
ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LIFE 287-99, 331-32 (1979) (discussing the flaws and
dangers in the substituted judgment test); Comment, Baby Doe Decisions:
Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63 NEB. L. REV. 888, 923-26 (1984).
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 44, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
See Note, The Tragic Choice: Termination of Carefor Patientsin a Permanent
Vegetative State, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 285 (1976).
P. RAmSEY, supra note 33, at 298.
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vives today with the aid of intravenous feeding.3 8
In re Storar exhibits the common law side of the legal spectrum.39 The Storar decision consolidated the cases of Brother Fox,
an 83-year-old vegetative patient whose life was dependent upon a
respirator, and John Storar, an extremely retarded, terminally-ill
patient in need of blood transfusions to survive.40 The New York
Court of Appeals found that, at a time when Brother Fox was competent, he had expressed his desire to not be submitted to life-pro41
longing procedures when there would be no chance of recovery.
The court held that Brother Fox had refused to consent to the current use of the respirator and authorized disconnection. 42 The decision was based upon the common law right to one's own bodily
integrity.43 From this foundation arises the doctrine of informed
consent,4 4 mandating that physicians must disclose the risks and
benefits of the proposed treatment to the patient in order for an
educated choice to be made. Once the patient reaches a decision,
it is the physician's duty to respect the patient's wishes; in fact, the
doctor is liable for battery if he treats the patient without the re45
quired consent.
Neither the common law nor the constitutional right to refuse
treatment is absolute. If any of four state interests outweigh the
individual's right to refuse treatment, that state may have the
treatment performed.4 6 These four interests are: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the maintenance of the
ethical integrity of the medical profession.4 7 The most important
of these interests is the preservation of life. Under its guise, nonconsenting patients have been required to receive life-saving treatment.48 Only the quality of life argument has been successful in
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Rust, supra note 18, at 16.
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
Id. at 370, 420 N.E.2d at 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
Id. at 384, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
Id.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 18, at 104 (4th ed. 1971).
See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (DeL 1980); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303
(1983); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809
(1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
47. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 735,
370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977).
48. See In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
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outweighing this interest.49 However, in the case of the comatose
5
O intensifies the state's inpatient, the doctrine of parens patriae
terest since the patient is incompetent. 51 This doctrine allows the
state to intervene and determine whether the incompetent person's best interests are being met.
The holdings have laid down multiple guidelines for properly
resolving the dilemma. It has been found that the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment is to be made by the doctor and patient alone.52 This reasoning supports the use of a Living W11,53
49. See Note, In re Quinlan: One Court's Answer to the Problem of Death With
Dignity, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (1977).
50. "Parenspatriae"
is defined literally as "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
51. 'Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King's power as guardian of
In the United
persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves ....
States, the 'royal prerogative' and the 'parens patriae' function of the King
passed to the States." Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
52. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
53. The Living Will has been explained as follows:
The Living Will is a document through which a person, while still
competent, directs that certain measures, usually so-called "heroic
medical measures," not be used to prolong life and suffering should
the person become terminally ill with no reasonable expectation of
recovery, and be unable to personally make treatment decisions.
Its purposes are: 1) to assure patient autonomy in regard to treatment during terminal illness, after the patient has become comatose
or incompetent; and 2) to offer a measure of protection against liability to physicians, health care professionals and institutions by providing documentation that the patient's consent to the withholding or
withdrawing of available life-prolonging technology, although given
in advance, was informed and understanding.
Concernfor Dying, A Legal Guide to the Living Will (Aug. 1983). The following is a recommended example of the Living Will:
TO MY FAMILY, MY PHYSICIAN, MY LAWYER AND
AND ALL OTHERS WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity and old ageit is one certainty of life. If the time comes when I can no longer
take part in decisions for my own future, let this statement stand
as an expression of my wishes and directions, while I am still of
sound mind.
If at such time the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or
mental disability, I direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept
alive by medications, artificial means or "heroic measures." I do,
however, ask that medication be mercifully administered to me to
alleviate suffering even though this may shorten my remaining
life.
This statement is made after careful consideration and is in accordance with my strong convictions and beliefs. I want the
wishes and directions here expressed carried out to the extent
permitted by law. Insofar as they are not legally enforceable, I
hope that those to whom this Will is addressed will regard themselves as morally bound by these provisions.
Signed
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that has been advocated, and in some states adopted, as a panacea

in the realm of life-sustaining treatment and the incompetent patient.54 In other jurisdictions, the existence of a Living Will has
been held to be of some evidentiary value but not necessarily sufficient to control the outcome of the decision.SS Regardless of holdings limiting court review,5 6 many courts have found that the
decision of whether a patient must undergo treatment should be
committees has
left to the judiciary.5 7 Lastly, the use of ethics
59

been both judicially praisedB and condemned.

While the courts have presented numerous guidelines to aid in

treatment versus non-treatment decisions, the guidelines cannot
be used to withdraw intravenous tubes until it is determined

whether nutrition and hydration are forms of treatment. In re Conroy addressed this issue prior to the Barber decision. 60 Immobi-

lized by organic brain syndrome 6 ' and numerous physical
Date
Witness

Witness
Copies of this request have been given
Concern for Dying, A Living Will (35th printing May, 1978).
54. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (Supp.
1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101-09 (Supp. 1980); NEv. REv. STAT.
§§ 449.540-690 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 244-7-1 to -11 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 90-320 to -321 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-090 (1981); TEX. REV.
CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 701.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1981).
55. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Ct.

App. 1983).
56. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 665-66 (1976); In re Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d 114, _ 660 P.2d 738, 746 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1350 (Del.
1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 passim (1977).
58. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49-50, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (1976).
59. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, __, 660 P.2d 738, 749 (1983) (finding that
ethics committees do not serve their desired function-a function best served
by a prognosis board).
60. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (1983), was decided on July 8th.
Barber was decided three months later, on Oct. 12th. Barber v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
"Organic brain syndrome" is defined as "[a] syndrome resulting
61.
from diffuse or local impairment of brain tissue function, manifested
by alteration of orientation, memory, comprehension, and judgment
...
." It is not the same as senile dementia, which is "Mental deterioration caused by atrophy of the brain due to aging."
In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 456 n.1, 464 A.2d 303, 304 n.1 (1983) (quoting
Dox, MELLONI

& EisNER, ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 347 (1979)).
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disabilities,62 84-year-old Claire C. Conroy was conscious, but described as "severely demented." She received nutrition and hydration through a nasogastric tube.63 The court held that the
intervenous fluids were not treatment that could be halted under a
right to privacy argument or on any other basis.64 Dehydrating
this patient to death would have been viewed as
and starving
65
homicide.
While the Superior Court of New Jersey declined to rule on
whether nutrition could ever be withheld from an incurable patient, the decision overturned the lower court and held that a patient must be provided with nutrition unless he is comatose, brain
dead, or vegetative, and death is irreversibly imminent. 66 The superior court opined that the lower court's ruling allowing the nasogastric tube's disconnection was legally and ethically
67
unacceptable:
It is clear that the physician's primary obligation is primum non nocere:
First do no harm. The Hippocratic Oath provides in part: "I will prescribe
regimenfor the good of my patientsaccording to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone." As an extension of these maxims,
medical ethicists have long distinguished between killing and letting die.
Hyland and Baime frame the distinction as one between euthanasia ("the
deliberate easing into death of a patient suffering from a painful and fatal
disease") and antidysthanasia ("the failure to take positive action to prolong the life of an incurable patient"). Hyland & Baime, In re Quinlan: A
Synthesis of Law and Medical Technology, 8 RTrr.-CAm.L.J. 37, 52 (1976).
While the latter has gained acceptance in the medical community, the former always has been considered unethical.6 8

The Conroy court concluded that the lower court had authorized
euthanasia by allowing nourishment to be withdrawn, and refused
to extend the Quinlan holding to allow sustenance to be withheld
62. She had diabetes, causing necrotic ulcers to develop on her left foot. Although Miss Conroy followed movements with her eyes, she did not respond
to verbal stimuli. Afflicted with gangrene and left in a semi-fetal position by
the contraction of her lower leg muscles, she was dependent upon nursing
care for survival. Id. at 457-58, 464 A.2d at 304-05.
63. The tube is described as "a simple flexible plastic tube that is run through the
patient's nose into the stomach and through which liquid nutrients are
passed." Id. Mr. Herbert's nasogastric tube was removed by the defendant,
Dr. Nejdl. People v. Barber, No. A 025 586, at 3 (Cal. L.A. County Super. Ct.
1983).
64. In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 469-70, 464 A.2d 303, 312 (1983). The court
reasoned, "[n] ourishment does not itself cure disease. Neither is it an artificial life-sustaining device. Rather it is a basic necessity of life whose withdrawal causes death and whose provision permits life to continue until the
patient dies of his illness or injury." Id.
65. Id. at 461, 464 A.2d at 306-07.
66. Id. at 469, 464 A.2d at 312.
67. Id. at 473-74, 464 A.2d at 314.
68. Id.
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from the incompetent person in this case. 69 The differences between this holding and the Barber decision must now be
examined.
B. Barber v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Mr. Clarence Herbert was admitted to Kaiser Hospital for the
routine removal of a colostomy bag and surgical closure of an ileostomy7 O on August 24, 1981. Two days later, Doctor Robert Nejdl,
along with his attending internist, Doctor Neil Barber, successfully
performed surgery to close the patient's ileostomy.7T The procedure was short and uneventful. Mr. Herbert was revived by the
anesthetist and moved to the recovery room. Later, in the recovery
room, a nurse discovered the patient in a cyanotic condition. 72 Attending nurses and physicians promptly resuscitated Mr. Herbert
and placed him on life-support systems. The anoxic 73 insult left
the patient comatose: no response to stimuli was reported. 74 After
being apprised of the situation, Mrs. Herbert expressed that her
husband would not wish to remain a "vegetable."
On August 27, Doctors Nejdl, Magnusson, Barber, and Freedman reached the prognosis that, while the patient had not suffered
brain death,75 Mr. Herbert would permanently remain in a "vegetative" state. 76 Dr. Freedman finished his examination by taking an
EEG 77 of Mr. Herbert. The following morning, after evaluating the
EEG results, Dr. Freedman concluded his diagnosis and recom69. Id. at 476, 464 A.2d at 315.
70. Ileostomy is defined as the "surgical creation of an opening into the ileum
[part of the small intestine], usually by establishing an ileal stoma on the
abdominal wall." DoRLAN's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY 650 (26th ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as DoRLAN''s].
71. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(1983).
72. "Cyanosis" is defined as "a bluish discoloration, applied especially to such
discoloration of skin and mucous membranes due to excessive concentration
of reduced hemoglobin in the blood." DoRLAn's, supra note 70, at 333.
73. Anoxia results from an inadequate "oxygen supply to tissue despite adequate
perefusion of the tissue by blood; the term is often used interchangebly with
hypoxia, to indicate a reduced oxygen supply." Id. at 85.
74. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(1983).
75. The definition of "brain death" is generally based upon the criteria established by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine
the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of IrreversibleComa, 205 J. A.M.A.
337 (1968). The criteria consist of no responsitivity, no movements or breathing, no reflexes, and, for confirmatory reasons, a flat electroencephalogram
(hereinafter referred to as an EEG). Id. at 337-38.
76. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, , 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486
(1983).
77. An EEG is a charting of one's brainwaves. DouLAND's, supra note 70, at 426.
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mended "non-heroic supportive care." 78 The doctors informed the
patient's family that Mr. Herbert's condition was immedicable,
with little or no chance of recovery. Mr. Herbert's family issued
the following: "We the immediate family of Clarence LeRoy Herbert on this day of August 29th 1981 would like all machines taken
off [sic] that are sustaining life. We release all liability to Hosp.
Dr. & staff. The family." 79 Dr. Barber removed the respirator and
had the moisture to Mr. Herbert's endotracheal tube halted. "The
likely result of this order, which was only changed two and a half
hours later at the insistence of a concerned nurse, was death by
'mucus plug.' "80 When Mr. Herbert's active brain stem 8 ' continued to stimulate his bodily functions, the family urged the doctors
to remove the intravenous tubes (hereinafter referred to as
I.V.'s).82 Their desires were met,'and after six days of dehydration,
resulting in the loss of six liters of body fluid,83 Mr. Herbert was
pronounced dead. Dr. Nejdl and Dr. Barber were charged with
murder for causing their patient's "life boat death."84
1. Holding of the Court
In a decision which the prosecution decided not to appeal, 85 the
California Court of Appeals held that the appellants' murder
charges were properly dismissed after the original court's preliminary hearing.86 The appellate court commented that the death was
78. Defendant's Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
79. Defendant's Brief, supra note 1, at 6.
80. Prosecution's Brief, supra note 3, at 8. For an explanation of the prosecutor's
use of this term, see supra note 3.
81. The brainstem is "the stemlike portion of the brain connecting the cerebral
hemispheres with the spinal cord and comprising [the sensory and motor terminals and the nucleus of the cranial nerves]." DoRLAND's,supra note 70, at
188. For further information, see supra note 25.
82. See supra note 4.
83. Such a loss was a "condition incompatible with life." Prosecution's Brief,
supra note 3, at 9.
84. Id. "Prison camp death" was another metaphor used by the prosecutor to
describe Mr. Herbert's fate. Id. The visual images of hopelessly stranding a
person at sea or locking him in a cell without nutrition and water are emotionally repulsive. The victim is visualized as attempting to escape, to survive, and, in the end, accepting and reflecting upon his feelings of
hopelessness and despair. Are these same feelings attributable to comatose
patients? The metaphors are not entirely accurate. In the case of the life
boat or prison camp, society's repulsion is centered partly upon the victim's
emotional misery. Nevertheless, even though the disgust is not as accute, the
imagery of a comatose person dying of dehydration in a life boat or prison
camp is still emotionally disturbing-particularly when there is one nearby
who could easily quench that person's thirst.
85. Rust, supra note 18, at 14.
86. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 494
(1983).
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a homicide resulting from an omission 8 7-the omission being the
withdrawal of the I.V.'s. Since one is not liable for an omission in

the absence of a duty,8 8 the physicians could not be tried for murder they were not obligated to continue nourishment and hydra-

tion, since the I.V.'s were noncurative treatment.8 9
2. Analysis of the Decision

The threshold question in Barber was whether the patient
should be considered alive, since the physicians could not have
been charged with the murder of a patient who was already dead. 90
According to the historical definition, death is established with the
end of all pulminary and respiratory operations. 9 ' In contrast, this
modern death statute of California termed death as the "total and
irreversible cessation of brain function." 92 The court concluded
that Mr. Herbert, according to the historical and statutory criteria,
was not dead at the time the IV.'s were withdrawn.93 Many commentators have agreed with the court's finding,9 4 while others
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at _, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487-88.
Id. at ._,195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
Id. at _ 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92.
Homicide requires the victim to be a living human being at the time of the
crime. "Shooting a dead body is not homicide, although it may be another
crime." W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRnuNAL LAw § 67, at 530

(1972).
91. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 32, 355 A.2d 647, 656 (1976) (citing A Definition of
IrreversibleComa, supra note 75, at 339).
92. CAL.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 1975) provides:
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician
that the person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of
brain function. There shall be independent confirmation of the death
by another physician. Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using other usual and customary procedures for determining death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a person dead.
Id. After Mr. Herbert's death, the statute was amended to read:
(a) An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead.
A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards.
(b) This article shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of
this article among states enacting it.
(c) This article may be cited as the Uniform Determination of Death
Act.
CAL. HEALTH &SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering Supp. 1984). Due to the nonfuctioning brain stem requirement, the amended statute would not have altered
the labeling of Mr. Herbert as a "living" human being.
93. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488
(1983).
94. See D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 103-05; Annas, Defining Death: There Ought
to be a Law, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1983, at 20; Bernat, Culver, &
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would argue that the patient was not a "living person"9 596with a
right to burden society with his metabolical maintenance.
Of course, the term homicide simply connotes the death of an
individual "at the hands of another."97 The court accepted the patient's death as a homicide and focused its opinion upon whether
the defendants had committed murder--"the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought."98 A homicide is generally
Gert, Defining Death in Theory and Practice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.
1982, at 5. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF
DEATH (1981).
95. For consideration of one's moral status as a "person" and the conditions
which constitute the presence of "personhood," see D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION:
LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY (1970); Engelhardt, "The Ontology of Abortion,"
84 ETHICS, Apr. 1974, at 217; Tooley, A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide, in
THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 51 (J. Feinberg ed. 1973); Warren, "On the Moral
and Legal Status of Abortion," in TODAY'S MODERN PROBLEMS 120 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1975). And for argument against the use of "personhood" in ethical decisionmaking, see Atkinson, Persons in the Whole Sense, 22 Am. J.
JuRis. 86 (1977).
96. Dr. Irvine Page has suggested that the nation's entire gross national product
could someday be consumed by maintaining all life for as long as it could be
maintained, and that "the money spent to maintain unconscious and hopelessly damaged persons could be used to restore those who are salvageable."
Robitscher, The Right to Die, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 11, 14.
The Barber court stated repeatedly that the issues involved were best decided by the legislature; yet, ironically, it based its holding on the inability of
California law to deal with the problem of the vegetative patient. Barber v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489-90 (1983). It
may be argued that a proper reading of the California Natural Death Act,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (Deering Supp. 1984), which allows
the use of Living Wills with instructions to withhold life-sustaining treatment, id. at § 7188, concerns itself with just such a case. See, e.g., Prosecution's Brief, supra note 3, at 6, 14. In response to such an argument, the court,
in Barber, suggested that "[in adopting the Natural Death Act, the legislature has gone part-way, but only part-way, in dealing with this troublesome
issue." Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
489 (1983) (citation omitted).
However, the court muddied the waters when it stated that the legislature's guidance is inadequate in this situation, yet, in another breath, announced that the proper standard to be applied is that standard set by the
legislature. This legislature had previously created the California Natural
Death Act. Since the court has articulated that the legislature is the "body
which must address the moral, social, ethical, medical and legal issues raised
by cases such as this one at bench," id., the court should interpret the passage of the Natural Death Act as a statement of legislative policy that withdrawal of life-support systems is acceptable only under the law's specific
criteria.
97. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487
(1983) (emphasis added).
98. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 918 (5th ed. 1979).
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unlawful unless it falls within the statutory exceptions of justifiable or excusable conduct.9 9 Neither concept was held to be applicable under California law.00 Hence, the court had to search
elsewhere in its quest to find that the defendants had acted
lawfully.
The court used the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research to support its position that physicians should not be subject
to criminal prosecutions in like situations.10 Commentators have
expressed an opposite view' 0 2 -a view which the Barber court im99. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. Scort, supra note 90, §§ 47-57 (justification or

excuse of a crime).
100. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488. The
noted statutes are presented below:
Excusable Homicide. Homicide is excusable in the following cases:
1. When committed by accident and misfortune, in lawfully correcting a child or servant, or in doing any other lawful act by lawful means with usual and ordinary caution, and without any
unlawful intent.
2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of
passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a
sudden combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or
unusual manner.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 195 (Deering 1975).

Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in any of
the following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person;
or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person,
against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or
surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner,
to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a
wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of
such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such
person, or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he
was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in
good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before
the homicide was committed or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and
means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in
lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (Deering 1975).
101. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d, 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488
(1983).
102. See R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 1, 61 (1976).
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plicitly found to have some pertinent weight. The prosecutor accused the defendants of attempting to cover-up, or mitigate,
malpractice damages. 103 Even though the court failed to deal expressly with this accusation, it did uphold the superior court's view
that malice could be presumed if Mr. Herbert was unlawfully and
intentionally killed.104
While motive is not traditionally an express element of murder
in this country, 0 5 it is difficult to separate the concepts of motive
and malice aforethought.106 Malice can be inferred "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."107 This
clearly indicates that the physicians would have been criminally
liable had they acted with the underlying motive of concealing or
minimizing damages attributable to medical malpractice. 0 8 It is
not difficult to imagine a case where an unscrupulous physician
would attempt to reduce damages arising from his own malpractice. This scenario could be achieved through advising withdrawal
of treatment to the patient's guardian when the prognosis is not
actually hopeless. Due to the municipal court's findings of fact, 0 9
the opinion did not address the possible presence of unlawfulness
through the defendant's motives.
The California Court of Appeals found that the physician's conduct did not fall under the state's murder statute by characterizing
that conduct as an omission rather than an action. 110 One is not
criminally liable for an omission to act unless he owes a particular
duty to the individual in peril;' 1 however, the disconnection of the
patient's I.V. was not an omission. The I.V. is a technological
means of providing sustenance. The use of this technology requires action, and the disconnection of such technology requires
103. Prosecution's Brief, supra note 3, at 13.
104. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, __ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487
(1983).
105. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 90, § 29, at 204-08.
106. "[T] he lack of precision in defining malice often makes it difficult to disentangle motive from a determination of what constitutes malice." Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (1983). See W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoT, supra note 90, at 29; G. WuLAMs, CRIMINAL LAw § 21, at
48-50 (2d ed. 1961).
107. BLACK'S LAw DCTIONARY 919 (5th ed. 1979).
108. This creates a precarious situation since it is often difficult to determine
where the fine line of medical malpractice begins.
109. "Although the actions of the attending physicians, Barber and Nejdl, may be
considered by some to have been precipitous, there is no evidence in the record before this court that such precipitous action was taken in violation of
standards of medical and ethical conduct." People v. Barber, No. A 025 586, at
10 (L.A. Mun. Ct. 1983).
110. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487-90.
111. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 90, § 27, at 190-91.
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an opposite action. Therefore, it could be argued that the withdrawal of the I.V. was not an omission but an action.11 2
Nevertheless, the court utilized its omission standard to hold
that the doctors had no professional duty to provide sustenance to
their vegetative patient. The I.V. was treatment since "[m] edical
procedures to provide nutrition and hydration are more similar to
other medical procedures than to typical human ways of providing
nutrition and hydration."113 This focus on the means of providing
sustenance does not serve to justify the unacceptable end-the
eventual dehydration and starvation of a living being. The court
cited the President's Commission to reason that the distinction between a respirator and an I.V. is based on emotion rather than reason.11 4 This position is unacceptable. The In re Conroy holding
(that nourishment is not treatment) is clearly preferable.1 15 The
foundation of this position was best expressed by Daniel
Callahan:16
The feeding of the hungry, whether because they are poor or because they
are physically unable to feed themselves, is most fundamental of all
human relationships. It is the perfect symbol of the fact that human life is
inescapably social and communal. We cannot live at all unless others are
prepared to give us food and water when we need them. If the duty of
parents toward infants provides a perfect example of inescapable moral
obligation, the giving of nourishment is its first and most basic manifestation. It is a most dangerous business to tamper with, or adulterate, so enduring and central a moral emotion, one in which the repugnance against
starving people to death could be, on occasion, greater than that which a
117
more straitened rationality would call for.

Ignoring the holding in Conroy, the Barber court further held
that physicians are not required to continue ineffective treatment,
and, since California recognizes a competent adult's right to refuse
112. See Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in SOCIAL ETHIcs: MORALr=Y
AND SOCIAL PoLIcY 62-66 (T. Mappes & J. Zembaty eds. 1977).
113. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490
(1983).
114. "[TJhe people who love and care about the patient should have a voice in
decisions. Certain options that are morally, medically, and legally valid
might be quite unacceptable to them." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 192 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION] (noting McCarthy, Care of

Persons in the Final State of Terminal Illness or Irreversibly Comatose, in
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN PROLONGING LIFE DECISIONS 196 (D. McCarthy & A.
Moraczewski eds. 1981), who argues that the distaste for withholding nourishment is psychologically, rather than morally, based).
115. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
116. Callahan is director of The Hastings Center. See Callahan, On Feeding the
Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 22.
117. Id.
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treatment" 8 as expressed through the patient's family, the homicide was not unlawful. This reasoning is tenuous in light of the
fact that the court held that a homicide was involved that was defined as a death "at the hands of another."" 9 If the withdrawal of
nourishment and hydration was an omission, then whose hands
caused the homicide? The surgeon's? The anesthetist's? The
court further muddled its logic:
In examining this issue we must keep in mind that the life-sustaining
technology involved in this case is not traditional treatment in that it is
not being used to directly cure or even address the pathological condition.
It merely sustains biological functions in120order to gain time to permit
other processes to address the pathology.

The court's holding that an I.V. is treatment is incorrect for
other reasons, as well. Since treatment traditionally involves "all
the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury or disease,"'21 one may
argue that the I.V. is not treatment because its purpose does not
propose to remedy the ailment.122 An argument in support of the
court's position would contend that treatment focuses upon the
health of the patient as a whole, rather than curing a particular
disorder. Perhaps the latter view is preferable; even so, the court
is not justified in equating treatment with nutrition and hydration.
Holding that nourishment is medical treatment dangerously
stretches medicine's domain. Such a position gives little credit to
the true purpose of the medical profession. If nutrition actually is
medical treatment, justice would demand that the American Medical Association open its ranks to many highly deserving chefs and
nutritionists across the nation. But this is not the case. Medicine's
purpose is to prevent and cure disease, and to provide physical
comfort to those in pain. The duties of the profession are terminated once the patient is beyond pain and recovery.
Lay persons rely greatly upon the physician to guide them in
making sound medical decisions; consequently, the doctor's integrity is essential to the decisionmaking process. He virtually controls the patient's decision as to treatment through his prognosis
and recommendations.123 The ordinary versus extraordinary distinction, which has been applied by some courts' 24 to determine
118. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
119. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487
(1983).
120. Id. at _ 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
121. BLAcK's LAW DIcToNARY 1346 (5th ed. 1979).

122. See D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 220; Rachels, supra note 112.
123. See R. VEATCH, supra note 102, at 59-61. For the physician's decision in the
intensive care unit, see D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 175-202.
124. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re
Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan,
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whether to discontinue life-support systems, was found to be inappropriate by the Barber court. 25 Instead, the opinion's guidance
for the physician was to weigh the patient's benefit from the treatment against the burdens imposed.126 The President's Commission was cited to support the proposition that even a minimally
burdensome treatment-intravenous feeding, perhaps-is disproportionate when there is no reasonable expectation of improvement. 2 7 According to the Barber court, "this determination is
essentially a medical one to be made at a time and on the basis of
facts which will be unique to each case."1 28 The decision to withdraw treatment is, therefore, properly completed when the patient
or his proxy is informed by the treating physician and he or his
29
proxy consent to the withdrawal.1
In summation, the Barber court reached five conclusions concerning the issues in route to its decision. The first, and most problematic, was that a treating physician commits murder when he
nefariously disconnects an IV. in order to mask or mitigate malpractice damages. The court dismissed the malpractice issue outof-hand and turned to the second issue of the case. The I.V. was
then held to be treatment rather than sustenance. This second determination became the essential premise of the remaining conclusions. Thirdly, withdrawing the IV. was not an affirmative act;
instead, it was held to be an omission to provide treatment to a
patient who properly refused it. Logically independent from the
third conclusion is the court's fourth finding, that a physician is not
obligated to continue treatment when the benefit of that treatment
is less than the burden it creates. Lastly, the court concluded that
the decision to withdraw treatment is a medical one to be made by
the treating physician-who, of course, may be held criminally liable-with the informed consent of the patient or his proxy. As a
result of these conclusions, the court in Barberdismissed the criminal charges against the defendants.
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303
(1983); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809
(1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
125. ' The use of these terms begs the question. A more rational approach involves the determination of whether the proposed treatment is proportionate
or disproportinate in terms of the benefits to be gained versus the burdens
caused." Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, , 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,

126.
127.
128.
129.

491 (1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at , 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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III. ALTERNATIVES, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND
CONCLUSIONS
A.

The Ideological Components of Medical Decisionmaking

Regarding the question of who should make the decision as to
whether the I.V. will be withdrawn, a majority of recent cases involving similar situations look to the patient as the final decisionmaker. 30 Logically, it may be quite reasonable for a patient in
a consumer society that emphasizes individual freedom to be allowed the right to shop about and discern which treatment is the
best. While patient autonomy formed the basis of the courts' decisions, other significant parties are essential to the decisionmaking
process. Hospital guidelines must be followed by those who care
for the patient and, occasionally, the hospital must also offer a
triage' 31 argument in favor of disconnection, especially in the case
of a full Intensive Care Unit (ICU).132 The patient's family is also
integral to the decisionmaking process, especially because the economic factor of providing nursing care to an incurably comatose
person may greatly influence the decision. Physicians control the
data available to the patient or the patient's proxy-information
that is necessary for an informed choice to be made about the patient's cure.1 33 However, the state is the most significant party in
the decisionmaking process. Subject to constitutional scrutiny,
the state's laws, prosecutors, and courts will invariably control the
range and availability of options that may be chosen.
Several premises exist for making such decisions. Pope Pius
XII offered the ordinary versus extraordinary distinction as a basis
for determining the correct care for patients, 34 but the Pope neglected to define the two terms. Treating extraordinary and ordinary synonymously with unusualness and usualness would be
inappropriate within the medical community, since it arbitrarily
leaves the patient's life dependent upon which hospital he is in.135
Courts,36 committees,137 and commentators 3 8 have reached a
130. See D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 216.
131. 'Triage" is sorting and ranking patients according to need and salvageability.

Id.
132. "If an ICU is full, and if a patient with very good chances of recovery with
critical care is waiting for a bed in the ICU, then a patient with not-so-good
chances may have to be sent to a medical ward. Evidently, this type of situation is not very frequent, but it does happen." Id. This argument has little
merit in the I.V. withdrawal case since the patient can simply be moved to a
nursing facility for nourishment and hygienic care.
133. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
134. Pius XII, The Prolongationof Life, 4 POPE SPEAKS 393-98 (1958).
135. R. VEATCH, s.upra note 102, at 105-15.
136. See supra note 46.
137. See PRESmENT'S COMInMSSION, supra note 114, at 82-89. The views of the
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consensus that the extraordinary/ordinary distinction is, in effect,
a balancing of interests. This line of reasoning suggests that extraordinary treatment is that which, in the patient's view, entails
significantly greater burdens than benefits and is, therefore, undesirable and not obligatory. Ordinary treatment, on the other hand,
is that which, in the patient's view, produces greater benefits than
burdens and is, therefore, desirable and must be undertaken. The
claim, then, that the treatment is extraordinary is more of an expression of the conclusion than a justification for it. Various methods of treatment, coupled with circumstances unique to each
patient, result in medical confusion and poor precedent; therefore,
the extraordinary/ordinary test is an unsatisfactory route to deci3 9
sions. The Barber court correctly recognized this inadequacy.
The next suggested guideline is rooted in the acting/omitting
distinction presented by the Barber court,140 and is analogous to
the active/passive distinction that has been applied in the euthanasia141 discussion.142 Active euthanasia has never been legally
accepted in this country.143 Nevertheless, the courts have traditionally been lenient towards those who have mercifully put an
end to a physically-suffering loved one's life.44 Active euthanasia
is best viewed as an action intentionally taken to assure a merciful
death, without relying on another extraneous force to perform the
task. 45 Passive euthanasia is explained as a release to the forces
of nature and from the compulsion to avoid them. 46 As noted
before,147 an omission generally does not result in criminal liability
unless there is a corresponding duty. The Barber court's use of
"omission" clearly reflects a concept of passive euthanasia that is
American Medical Association and Canadian Medical Association are quoted
in D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 223.
138. See D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 224; Robitscher, supra note 96.
139. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491

(1983).
140. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
141. Euthanasia, literally translated, means "easy death." WEBSTER'S, THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (3d ed. 1971).

142. See R. VEATCH, supra note 102, at 97-103; D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 233-38;
Beauchamp, A Reply to Rachels on Active and PassiveEuthanasia,in SociAL
ETmcs: MOR= AND SOcIAL PouIcY 67 (T. Mappes &J. Zembaty eds. 1977);
Dinello, On Killing and Letting Die, 31 ANALYSIS, Jan. 1971, at 83; Geddes, On
the Intrinsic Wrongness of Killing Innocent People, 33 ANALYsIs, Jan. 1983, at

93; Rachels, supra note 112.
143. See Should There Be A Legal Right to Euthanasia?,in SOCIAL ETHIcs: MoRA'r AND SocIAL PoLIcY 35-36 (T. Mappes & J. Zembaty eds. 1977).

144. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A ProsecutorialView of the Quinlan Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 304, 310 (1977).

145. D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 235-36.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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in line with previous decisions. 4 8
The essence of this distinction in defining the medical role is to draw the
sometimes subtle distinction between those situations in which the withholding of extraordinary measures may be viewed as allowing the disease
to take its natural course and those in which
the same actions may be
149
deemed to have been the cause of death.

The notion that a disease should take its course lends no credibility to the withdrawal of I.V.'s. The patient does not die of the disease that immobilized him; rather, his death results from
dehydration and starvation.
The active/passive characterization has been addressed by several commentators, and those advocating the distinction focus
principally upon the respective responsibilities and motives of the
decisionmakers' 5 0-primarily the socio-psychological implications
of being an actor rather than a non-actor.151 Commentators have
attacked the dichotomy because the result, and the respective
knowledge of the individuals involved, are in fact identical, regard52
less of whether the incident concerned an action or an omission.1
One argument is that the categorization is relevant for the reason
that the active killing of a human being conflicts with the physician's role in society.15 3 The merit of this assumption is doubtful,
since neglecting to save a human life when one has the power to do
so is also contrary to the duties of the physician.
Another proposition in favor of the active/passive test involves
the belief that the long-range consequences would be different if
doctors practiced active, rather than passive, euthanasia.15 4 Once
the physician commits active euthanasia he is stepping onto a slippery slope155 which will start a downhill slide to moral depravity.
By condoning this form of killing, a "wedge" has been inserted into
the public's condemnation of killing. Society can no longer hold
the line against a legal progression toward the slaughter of those
who are considered a nuisance to it. The fear may be wellfounded, but the wedge is just as likely to be driven by passive
euthanasia. In fact, passive nontreatment is currently used to rid
148. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
149. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738,
370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977).
150. See, e.g., D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 233-38; Beauchamp, supra note 142.
151. See, e.g., D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 233-38; Beauchamp, supra note 142.
152. See Dinello, supra note 142; Geddes, supra note 142; Rachels, supra note 112.
153. R. VEATCH, supra note 102, at 83.
154. Id. at 87-88.
155. Commonly called the "wedge" argument, it is illustrated by the theory that
the holocaust in Nazi Germany was a direct result of that society's acceptance and use of active euthanasia. Alexander, Medical Science UnderDictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J. MED. 39 (1949).
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society of undesirable infants. 56 It is obvious upon reflection that
the active/passive dichotomy's vague criteria, and its policy ramifications, render the Barber court's omission standard inadequate
as legal precedent. The dichotomy lends little security to future
patients, doctors, and medical staffs faced with this dilemma.
B.

Systems to Assure that Proper Decisions Are Made

The available methods to organize and guide decisionmaking
toward a result that is both legally and morally satisfying will now
be considered. The first two methods to be discussed, those of
physician-patient and judicial intervention, are clearly inadequate
when dealing with the incurably comatose patient. Two alternatives, statutory guidance and ethics committees, will then be
strongly recommended. In order to appreciate the advantages of
the recommended systems, the more undesirable methods will be
examined first.
1.

Physician-PatientIntervention

The guidelines set by the Barber court place the decisionmaking power solely within the physician-patient relationship. 5 7 This
position has clearly evolved from society's interest in protecting
individual freedoms, 58 and from its recognition of the patient's
right to make decisions regarding his treatment and the emotional
stress and financial strain he is willing to undertake. 59 When the
patient is incompetent, as was the case in Barber,it is usually held
60
that the patient's family may make the informed choice for him.
Under such circumstances, the resulting decision is usually the
product of conflicting views and opinions.' 6 ' The doctor, who, according to the Barber court labors under the fear of criminal liability,' 62 must make a recommendation that will weigh heavily in the
decisionmaking process. Ultimately, however, the decision rests
with the family members who are presumed to know the patient's
156. See Indiana ex rel. Infant Doe v. Monroe Cir. Ct., No. 482 5140 (Ind. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 16, 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983) (upholding the right of a handicapped infant's parents to cause the baby's death by withholding corrective
surgery and nourishment). See also Comment, supra note 33.
157. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
158. See Comment, The Problem of Prolonged Death." Who Should Decide?, 27
BAYLOR L. REV. 169 (1975).
159. Id. at 170.
160. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487

(1983).
161. See D. WALToN, supra note 19, at 211-15.
162. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487
(1983).
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desires and are capable of looking after his best interests.163
The physician-patient system of decisionmaking inherently
contains too many policy problems to be acceptable. Through the
common law and statutory tradition, the family is often given
guardianship of the incompetent.164 The virtue of this practice is
darkened by the family's own interest in disconnecting the I.V.:
One need not go so far back in history as Cain and Abel to recognize that
the interests of various family members are not always synonymous nor
even harmonious. The newspaper is a daily reminder that murderers are
often related to their victims.
[T] his consideration ... is a factor which
165
must be taken into account.

Even though the possibility that a family member would exercise
his decisionmaking power to murder his kin may be remote, personal grudges and greed can become motivating factors in the decisionmaking process.1 66
The physician's function in the system is also subject to serious
doubt. Before recommending that the I.V.'s be withdrawn, the
physician must initially diagnose his patient and then come to the
conclusion that the patient is irreversibly moribund. Once this
conclusion has been reached, the physician must inform the
guardian of his prognosis and its consequences, so that the guardian can make an informed decision. Of course, a strong statement
against painful treatment is recommended.167 In addition, it has
been advocated that the physician should be allowed to override
the family's wishes until there is no doubt over the possibility of
68
recovery.1
Because the physician must serve interests other than those of
his patient, his role in the decisionmaking process is problematic.
For example, triage may compel the doctor to urge the disconnection of one patient so that others who require the use of the same
limited medical resources,169 or who are in need of an organ donor,
can be cared for.170 The physician must also consider the well163. Id. at _ 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
164. "Not infrequently, the committeeship of the person and of the estate was entrusted to one and the same person. In other cases the heir, if he chose, was
appointed committee of the estate, and the next of kin committe of the person." In re Rollins, 65 A.2d 667, 680 (N.J. Mercer County Ct. 1949).
165. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 618 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the use of a Living Will, see supra note 53, is not
in itself outcome determinative, but has great evidentiary value in judicial
proceedings concerning the withdrawal of respirators from comatose
patients).
166. See Comment, supra note 158, at 172.
167. See D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 180-81.
168. Id. at 200-02.
169. Id. at 117.
170. See Judicial Council, Ethical Guidelinesfor Organ Transplantation, 205 J.
A.M.A. 341 (1968) (issuing guidelines to physicians in organ donor situations,
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being of the patient's family, which may result in a bias toward
withdrawing the I.V.171 "Ultimately, [the physician] tries to represent all of these 'patients' within the ill-defined decisionmaking
He will try to diagnose something he calls 'hopelessformula ....
face of 'hopelessness,' he may decide to
ness.' In the
172
disconnect."
Perhaps the most persuasive argument against allowing the
physician such prominence in the decisionmaking system is that
the doctor's competency is in medicine, not in determining matters
173
of public policy with regard to criminal liability or quality of life.
In addition, since the physician must make a recommendation
under the shadow of possible criminal liability, it does not seem
plausible to thrust the responsibility of making these life and
death decisions upon him simply because he is a member of the
medical profession.
2. JudicialIntervention
Another alternative is to leave the decision to the judiciary.
The courts would be welcome participants in as much as:
1) Society already looks to the courts as arbitrators of questions of fact,
even those with great moral ramifications.
2) Protecting the rights of individuals is a prime directive in our courts.
Specifically, American courts are well versed in the nuances of our constitutional standards of due process as it applies to the right to life.
3) The courts would provide a forum where [interested] groups could coordinate their input of information and concern.
4) The courts could provide the ultimate safeguard against those who
might not have the patient's best interest at heart.
5) Finally, the courts could provide the focal point for society's participation in this most crucial decision. Through the courts, society could share
in the legal and moral responsiblity of this decison which bears so heavily
174
on individuals.

Although the legal process might be streamlined to quickly attend
to these matters, the myriad of new cases175 would severely encumber an already overtaxed judicial system with matters which
usually become moot before a decision is rendered. 76 Also, there
are serious economic questions that must be dealt with before
vesting the decisionmaking power in the courts. For example,
one of which is that the physician owes his primary duty to his patient and
must protect the donor and recipient equally).

171. See Levine, Disconnection: The Clinician's View, 6 HAsTiNGS CENTER
Feb. 1976, at 11.
172. Id. at 12.

REP.,

173. See Kennedy, Switching OffLife Support Machines: The Legal Implications,
1977 CRIM. L. REv. 443, 444.
174. Comment, supra note 158, at 172-73.
175. See supra note 18.
176. See In re Quinlan 70 N.J. 10, 49-50, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (1976).
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who should be forced to pay the court and hospital costs that rapidly aggregate during these often lengthy judicial proceedings? Is
it fair to force an already suffering family to accept the burden?
Obviously not. However, given the selfish and callous nature of
our society, it would be unrealistic to expect that the taxpayer
77
would be willing to foot the bill for this astronomical expense.1
3. Statutory Guidelines
Under the common law, death was defined as the irreversible
loss of vital fluid flow and separation of the soul from the body. 7 8
These two views of death still prevail, albeit in a slightly more refined form. Regrettably, the camps of debate are split, each adopting only one hybrid portion of the preceding benchmark. In one
camp there are those who define death as the disintegration of the
organism,179 in the other, those who maintain that loss of personhood 80 is the end of that person's life.181 Supporters of the ces177.

178.
179.
180.
181.

Our society is not committed to preserving life at any cost. In its
broadest sense, this rather unpleasant notion should be obvious.
Wars are fought. The University of Mississippi is integrated. But
what is more interesting to the study of accident law, though perhaps
equally obvious, is that lives are used up when the quid pro quo is
not some great moral principle but "convenience." Ventures are undertaken that, statistically at least, are certain to cost lives. Thus, we
build a tunnel under Mont Blanc because it is essential to the Common Market and cuts down the traveling time from Rome to Paris,
though we know that about a man per kilometer of tunnel will die.
We take planes and cars rather than safer, slower means of travel.
And perhaps most telling, we use relatively safe equipment rather
than the safest imaginable because-and it is not a bad reason-the
safest costs too much.
Of course, it is rarely known who is to die. Indeed, in the uncustomary case of an individual-a known individual rather than a statistical unknown-in a position of life or death, we are apt to spend very
much more to save him than in any conceivable money sense he is
worth. And while I do not doubt this is as it should be, it seems odd
that we should refuse to apply the same standards of "value beyond
any price" when we deal with the same man's life as part of a statistic. But odd or not, it is the case.
Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of
Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713, 716 (1965). It seems quite obvious that society
would treat the incurably comatose patient's life as a statistic in determining
whether it should foot the patient's bill during judicial proceedings. Medical
services and products have astonishingly high price tags. When society plays
with these figures, the result is likely to favor the preservation of medical
resources, not because of moral principles but primarily out of greed and
convenience.
See R. VEATCH, supra note 102, at 29-31.
See Bernat, Culver, & Gert, supra note 94.
See supra note 95; Steinbock, The Removal of Mr. Herbert'sFeeding Tube, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 13.
It might also be argued that the loss of personhood may not be equivalent to
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sation-of-the-organism criterion assert that death is a biological
term which must be applicable to all species of life. 182 This premise does not necessarily put the two positions at odds: each species could be deemed to have lost its status as a living creature
upon the privation of characteristics which are attributable to its
biological cognomen. For example, an amoeba with a destroyed
nucleus could be legally accepted as dead, since it lacked the qualities of a living amoeba. Physiologists' opinions notwithstanding,
there is no logical reason for law to characterize a human's death
by metabolic function alone. The law has consistently focused
upon behavior and viability 83 to find justice, and there is no sufficient reason to abandon this tradition in determining death.
Therefore, it is conceivable that the cerebrum is the legal focus of
death, and a legislature that wished to accept this view of death
could do so statutorily.
Several professional organizations 8 4 have suggested that the
states adopt the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) definition of death as law:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A
determination 1of
death must be made in accordance with accepted medi85
cal standards.

The UDDA is similar to the California statute186 that classified Mr.
Herbert as being alive at the time his I.V.'s were withdrawn.187 If a
legislature wished to adopt the cerebral standard of defining death,
it could amend the UDDA,188 replacing the term "brain" with cerebrum and deleting the phrase: "including the brain stem." Accepted medical technology would remain to determine whether
cerebral death occurred. New indicators of death would not only
be allowable, but encouraged. 8 9 The statute could also be ex-

182.
183.

184.
185.
186.
187.

death, but the state no longer has a compelling interest in preserving the life,
since the "person" is no longer viable. See Note, supra note 36, at 291-93.
See Bernat, Culver, & Gert, supra note 94.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding in part that the unborn
fetus is not a person protected by the fourteenth amendment, and the state's
interest in the potential life is not "compelling" until the fetus reaches
viability).
The American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the President's Commission, support the UDDA. See Annas, supra note 94, at 20.
Id. at 21.
See supra note 92.
Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, _ 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488

(1983).
188. For another proposal of a cerebral death statute, see R. VEATCH, supra note
102, at 76.
189. Neocordical and appallic diagnosis may become more definite, or the use of
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panded to avoid conflicts of interest 90 and to include procedures
for appeal.191
Of course, the need for legislation is absent where society
agrees with the medically accepted view. 192 In such an atmosphere, the physician would not labor under the fear of civil and
criminal liability. The fact remains, however, that statutory definitions of death have great utility in today's social environment. Not
only is society unable to agree with one medically accepted view,
but the medical profession itself is unable to subscribe to a single
determination of death.193 Through public input, the legislation
would embody the public will,194 dispel doubt,195 and relieve medical practitioners of liability.196 This is clearly the most appropriate
method of addressing the issue of whether to withdraw the I.V.
from incurably comatose patients. If society does demand that
nourishment be disconnected from patients who have lost all cerebral functioning, it is preferable to view that individual as dead
rather than alive. The only reason to continue to feed a cadaver is
to later extract its donated fluids and organs.197 On the other hand,
starving a person who is categorized as living would be deemed
barbaric. Once we legally sanction the starvation of one socially
undesirable person, can we prevent the withholding of nourish98
ment to the severely retarded or handicapped?1
Future medical decisions must be made in the void left by legislative inertia. This Article next discusses, and advocates, the use
of ethics committees to protect the individuals involved in these
decisions while the legislators redefine death. In fact, society may
find that incurably comatose patients should never be denied food
and water. Whichever route the legislators decide to follow, the
result-from the body which has traditionally exercised the power
angiographs may be commonly adopted. See D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 7072, 100-03.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See R. VEATCH, supra note 102, at 76.
See Note, supra note 36, at 298.
See Annas, supra note 94.
Compare Kennedy, supra note 173, at 446, with Bernat, Culver, & Gert, supra
note 94.
See supra note 184.
See Annas, supra note 94.
Id.
See Gaylin, supra note 18.
One may attack this argument because it is based upon semantics. This is
openly acknowledged. While the linguistics of the alternatives are different,
the end result is still the same. But, due to its direct effect upon the evolution
of social consciousness, language is a powerful force in society. Words have
the ability to mold perceptions. Since morality is partially dependent upon
perceptions, the semantic argument in favor of redefining death is a weighty
one.
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to create laws that govern society-would be a cherished one.1 9 9
4. Ethics Committees
The New Jersey Supreme Court advised hospitals to develop
committees that would review the physician's decision to disconnect a patient from a respirator. 200 Since then a number of professional organizations 2 01 and scholars 202 have endorsed the use of
ethical committees in medical decisionmaking. The ethics committee's role has evolved into a coadunation of advocate, counselor, educator, and judge with the primary objective of improving
the ethical quality of medical decisions. 03 The composition of the
committee is a crucial factor in assuring the representation of a
proper balance of interests. 2 04 The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that the committee should be composed of the
following seven members to achieve such a balance: two physicians, one nurse, one hospital administrator, one lawyer, one
ethicist or clergyman, and a lay person as community
205
representative.
Once the members are selected-preferably by an elected offi199. When faced with the precept that a cerebral definition of death would be inappropriate, perhaps on the theory that some thought processes may be deep
brain or subcordical, see D. WALTON, supra note 19, at 84, other methods of
decisionmaking may help ease the predicament. One solution would be to
draft legislation approving active euthanasia for those in a vegetative state.
See Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder, 43 MiNN. L. REV. 1
(1958) (arguing against the cruelty of refusing to allow one to die, and the
lack of social interest to warrant this infringement upon the individual's freedom). Under an active euthanasia statute, the patient's demise would be
more humane and less costly. Compassion would encourage a simple injection to end the patient's life rather than the time-consuming methods of
starving or dehydrating the patient to death. But see Kamisar, Some NonReligous Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MImN. L.
REV. 969 (1958) (arguing that active euthanasia, whatever its form, leads to
moral degradation). Nevertheless, the adoption of an active euthanasia statute may be unrealistic in a state that does not accept a cerebral definition of
death.
200. In re Quinlan 70 N.J. 10, 49-50, 355 A.2d 647, 668-69 (1976).
201. These organizations include the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the
National Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Federation of American Hospitals, the American Hospital Association, and the National Perinatal
Association. See Fleischman & Murry, Ethics Committeesfor Infants Doe?, 13
HASTiNGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1983, at 5, 8.
202. Id. at 5. See also Randal,Are Ethics Committees Alive and Well?, 13 HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Dec. 1983, at 10; Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective
Newborns: An Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARv. LEGIs. 137
(1983).
203. See Fleischman & Murry, supra note 201, at 8.
204. Id.
205. See Randal, supra note 202; Shapiro, supra note 202.
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cial of the community 206-- the committee would be responsible for
two tasks. The initial undertaking would be to conduct a prospective review of the attending physician's conclusions. The ethics
committee would examine the prognosis, and then establish that
there has been a clear flow of communication between the physi207
cian and his patient or the patient's guardian.
The final phase of the prospective review is debatable. Upon
reaching an ethical consensus, the committee may themselves
make the decision of whether to withdraw the I.V. or "decide who
should decide."208 Those who favor the latter position contend
that "the job of ethics committees is to see that clearly wrong decisions are not permitted. They should be a check on bad decisions,
209
not the primary deciders themselves."
The propriety of withholding actual decisionmaking power from
the ethics committee is questionable. Once it has reached a decision, it is illogically excessive to force the committee to select a
party whose position embodies that decision rather than simply
mandating the result itself. In fact, the procedure of "deciding who
decides" these ethical and moral questions may be counterproductive. It diminishes the importance of each member's vote and fails
to protect the individual decisionmaker from liability. Also, bureaucratic detachment toward the patient may result when the
committee is so far removed from the consequences of its decision.
Therefore, the ethics committee should conclude the prospective
review by issuing a directive to the medical staff.
The final, although not entirely separate, duty of the ethics committee is that of retrospective review. 210 Such a review allows the
committee to make post hoc determinations as to what could have
been done better, and aids in establishing guidelines for the future.
Of course, the ethics committee's decision may be challenged in
206. Most ethics committees today are institutional ethics committees (IECs),
which operate within a single hospital. See Randal, supra note 202. However,
a committee selection process that is accountable to the people is by far more
preferable. A committee chosen by a hospital is likely to be dominated by

207.
208.
209.
210.

members who weigh economic resources too heavily, and may do little to actually diffuse liability from the hospital. A selection system that is accountable to the public would be preferable since liability for the decision would be
severed from the hospital, and, more importantly, the panel would embody
the people's moral wisdom. This is no easy task, and the route to be taken
would depend greatly upon the laws, population and needs of each particular
community. Nevertheless, the medical and legal professions' ability to make
such changes occur rapidly should not be doubted.
See Fleischman & Murry, supra note 201.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
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the courts and its liability is yet unknown. 2 11 However, if the public was made responsible for the committee members' selection,212
it would be difficult to hold the members criminally liable, in the
absence of extreme misconduct.
None of the arguments levied against the use of ethics committees seem to be insurmountable. Though the decisionmaking process of ethics committees may be slow and cumbersome, it is far
more expedient than that of the court system and affords greater
protection to the patient's right to privacy, since it draws less publicity than judicial proceedings. 2 13 Ethics committees are largely
self-taught, which might lead to arbitrary decisions; 214 however,
the recency of this issue and the relative lack of case law leaves
any decisionmaking, whether it be by judge or doctor, open to the
same attack. The process of retrospective review would continually supplement the committee's expertise through hindsight, leaving them in a far superior position to other decisionmakers.
Another objection to establishing the ethics committee as the
primary decisionmaker is premised on the notion that the question
involved is purely medical. It can be argued that, since the decision which must be made regarding the life or death of the patient
hinges so critically upon medical determinations, the ethics committee is an inappropriate body of persons to be deciding the issue,
and must be replaced by a prognosis board consisting solely of
neurologists. 215 Although it is true that medical facts are critical to
the decisionmaking process, equally important are the socio-philosophical ramifications of the decision. The dominance of the hospital and medical profession in addressing these more universal
questions must be kept in check by the nonmedical members of
the committee and those who appoint the committee members.
The final argument against vesting the ethics committees with
absolute decisionmaking power is that such committees violate the
patient's freedom of choice and dignity, and interfere with the physician's freedom to practice medicine. Arguably, the incompetent
patient cares little about his freedom of choice and dignity; on the
other hand, the ethics committee may actually help the competent
patients who 'Tid themselves browbeaten-by the hospital environment, their families' wishes, and the agendas of physiciansinto accepting [or refusing] aggressive therapeutic measures
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 9.
See supra note 206.
See Randal, supra note 202, at 10.
Id. at 12.
See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, _, 660 P.2d 738, 749 (1983); Collester, supra
note 144, at 320.
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The patient's interests are further protected through the

ethics committee's evaluation and disclosure of all medical options
available to the patient. In addition, such committees could guarantee a greater degree of impartiality and uniformity than that offered by individual physicians. Finally, the ethics committees may
actually promote the physician's freedom to practice medicine by
relieving him of the burden of making these life and death decisions which are not fairly his to make and, thereby, diffusing the
potential for criminal and civil liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Recent technological advances in medicine have greatly aided
the medical profession and society as a whole. Yet scientific progress has created perplexing situations that transcend the realm of
medicine. The physician may unknowingly act beyond his domain
as his role becomes increasingly uncertain. Such is the case when
the physician withdraws nourishment and hydration from a living
person. The blame for this unacceptable development cannot be
cast upon the medical profession; it is a product of society's inability to symmetrically adapt to its rapidly changing world. The physician has labored enough under the constant spectre of
malpractice litigation, professional sanctions, and personal conscience, to be burdened with a decision which may lead to criminal
liability. However, relieving this burden by allowing the doctor,
through omission, to dehydrate and starve a living, incurable patient through omission is clearly unsatisfactory. Such coldhearted
selfishness and- disregard for human life flies in the face of society's purpose, and constitutes an unbalanced leap onto that slippery slope to moral depravity.
The answer may be found within the meaning of the word "living." Recognition of a cerebral definition of death would relieve
the physician of this burden, but adoption of the proper statute
requires further debate and analysis. In most situations, the only
immediate method of relieving the doctor's liability is through an
ethics committee. However, the ethics committee must remember
that when the question is solely one of whether to halt a "living"
person's nourishment and hydration, the committee has no choice
but to protect that life. In doing so, the values of society are embraced and reaffirmed.
j.p. chrisman '85

216. See Randal, supra note 202, at 12.

